By Ross Douthat, NY Times
“The Children of Men,” P. D. James’s 1992 novel, is set in a future where the world’s male population has become infertile, and an aging Britain is adapting to the human race’s gradual extinction. Women push dolls in baby carriages. Families baptize kittens. There are state-run “national porn shops” to stimulate the flagging male libido. Suicide flourishes. Immigrants are welcomed as guest laborers but expelled once they become too old to work. The last children born on earth—the so-called “Omegas”—have grown up to be bored, arrogant, antisocial and destructive.
“The Children of Men,” P. D. James’s 1992 novel, is set in a future where the world’s male population has become infertile, and an aging Britain is adapting to the human race’s gradual extinction. Women push dolls in baby carriages. Families baptize kittens. There are state-run “national porn shops” to stimulate the flagging male libido. Suicide flourishes. Immigrants are welcomed as guest laborers but expelled once they become too old to work. The last children born on earth—the so-called “Omegas”—have grown up to be bored, arrogant, antisocial and destructive.
James’s book, like most effective dystopias, worked by exaggerating
existing trends—the plunge in birthrates across the developed world, the spread
of voluntary euthanasia in nations like the Netherlands and Switzerland, the
European struggle to assimilate a growing immigrant population.
But one developed nation is making “Children of Men” look particularly
prophetic. In Japan, birthrates are now so low and life expectancy so great
that the nation will soon have a demographic profile that matches that of the
American retirement community of Palm Springs. “Gradually but relentlessly,”
the demographer Nick Eberstadt writes in the latest issue of The Wilson
Quarterly, “Japan is evolving into a type of society whose contours and
workings have only been contemplated in science fiction.”
Eberstadt has spent years writing about the challenges posed by
declining fertility around the globe. But Japan, he notes, is a unique case.
The Japanese birthrate hovers around just 1.3 children per woman, far below the
level required to maintain a stable population. Thanks to increasing life
expectancy, by 2040 “there could almost be one centenarian on hand to welcome
each Japanese newborn.” Over the same period, the overall Japanese population
is likely to decline by 20 percent, with grim consequences for an
already-stagnant economy and an already-strained safety net.
Japan is facing such swift demographic collapse, Eberstadt’s essay
suggests, because its culture combines liberalism and traditionalism in
particularly disastrous ways. On the one hand, the old sexual culture, oriented
around arranged marriage and family obligation, has largely collapsed. Japan is
one of the world’s least religious nations, the marriage rate has plunged and
the divorce rate is higher than in Northern Europe.
Yet the traditional stigma around out-of-wedlock childbearing endures,
which means that unmarried Japanese are more likely to embrace “voluntary
childlessness” than the unwed parenting that’s becoming an American norm. And
the traditional Japanese suspicion of immigration has endured into the 21st
century as well. Eberstadt notes that “in 2009 Japan naturalized barely a third
as many new citizens as Switzerland, a country with a population only 6 percent
the size of Japan’s and a reputation of its own for standoffishness.”
These trends are a dystopia. Rental “relatives” are available for
sparsely attended wedding parties; so-called “babyloids”—furry dolls that mimic
infant sounds—are being developed for lonely seniors; and Japanese researchers
are at the forefront of efforts to build robots that resemble human babies. The
younger generation includes millions of so-called “parasite singles” who still
live with (and off) their parents, and perhaps hundreds of thousands of the
“hikikomori”—“young adults,” Eberstadt writes, “who shut themselves off almost
entirely by retreating into a friendless life of video games, the Internet and
manga (comics) in their parents’ home.”
wow.....but Europe (Germany) is not too far away from that picture. Here some facts:
ReplyDeleteVon der Leyen pointed to the increase in the fertility rate in Germany, which rose to 1.37 children per woman in 2007 from 1.33 in 2004. However that is still a long way from the so-called "replacement rate" of 2.1 children per woman that demographers say is necessary to maintain population levels. Even if one factors in a high level of immigration -- itself a political hot potato in Germany -- a birth rate of around 1.7 children per women is needed to stop the population in an industrialized country from shrinking.
Von der Leyen sees the birth-rate up-tick as confirmation that the family policies she has pursued since 2005 are having the desired effect. One of the cornerstones of her program is benefit payments for parents known as Elterngeld (literally "parents money"). Under the new benefit, introduced in January 2007, the state pays the parent who stays home with the child 67 percent of that parent's current net income, up to a maximum of €1,800 ($2,810) a month for up to 12 months. If both parents elect to take time off, the total number of months the benefit is paid, split between both parents, goes up to 14 -- a measure intended to encourage fathers to take time off work. And it seems to be working -- the latest figures suggest that some 15 percent of fathers are taking at least two months off work under the scheme.
The reason for the generous measures is clear: The low birth rate will have serious consequences for Germany if it is not corrected. In its most recent projections, published in 2006, the Federal Statistical Office warned that Germany's population could drop from around 82 million today to as low as 69 million by 2050 "if the demographic situation continues to develop along current lines."