By Eric
Margolis
Many Americans
have trouble understanding modern Russia or leader Vladimir Putin. That’s in
good part because they have little or no understanding of Russia’s history or
geopolitics.
“The Soviets
Union will return” I wrote in 1991 after the collapse of the USSR deprived the
Russian imperium of a third of its territory, almost half its people and much
of its world power.
A similar
disaster for Russia occurred in 1918 at the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Defeated
by the German-Austrian-Bulgarian-Turkish Central Powers in World War I and
racked by revolution, Lenin’s new Bolshevik regime bowed to German demands to
hand over the Baltic states and allow Ukraine to become independent.
As soon as
Josef Stalin consolidated power, he began undoing the Brest-Litovsk surrender.
The Baltic states, Ukraine, the southern Caucasus and parts of “Greater
Romania” were reoccupied. Half of Poland again fell under Russian control.
Stalin restored his nation to its pre-war 1914 borders, killing millions in the
process.
In the 1930’s, Adolf
Hitler was tearing down the equally cruel Versailles Treaty that left millions
of ethnic Germans stranded in hostile nations and deprived Germany of its
historic eastern regions. Hitler claimed his invasion of Russia was motivated
by Germany’s strategic imperative to acquire farm lands so it could attain food
security.
The Central
Powers—notably Germany and Austro-Hungary—could not produce enough food to feed
their growing populations. Imports were essential.
A major cause
of the defeat of the Central Powers was mass civilian starvation caused by
Britain’s naval blockade that cut off grain imports, a crime under
international law. Hitler said he had to acquire Ukraine’s rich farmlands for
national security—a term we often hear today. Like American today with oil,
Germany insisted it had to be food independent.
Germany’s march
east began in 1938 by Anschluss (reunification) with Austria—76 years ago this
month. Czechoslovakia’s ethnic German majority in the province of Sudetenland
soon followed.
Today, we are
seeing another Anschluss with the reunification of Ukrainian-ruled Crimea with
Russia.
Crimea was
detached from the Russian Republic in 1954 by Nikita Khrushchev after a drunken
dinner and given as a grand (but then empty) gesture to the Ukrainian Soviet
Republic. Khrushchev was a Ukrainian Communist party boss who had participated
in Stalin’s murder of 6-7 million Ukrainian farmers.
This is the
first step in President Vladimir Putin’s slow, patient rebuilding of some of
the former Soviet Union. What triggered his move was Washington’s engineering
of a coup against Ukraine’s corrupt but elected pro-Russian president, Viktor
Yanukovich.
The minute
Ukraine fell under western influence, Putin began moving to detach Crimea and
rejoin it to historic Russian rule. Or misrule: Crimea and the Caucasus was the
site of the holocaust of up to 3 million Muslims of the Soviet Union who were
ordered destroyed by Stalin, among them most of Crimea’s Muslim Tatars.
No western
leaders should have been surprised by Crimea. Nations still have strategic
sphere of influence. In 1991, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev refused to use
force to keep the union together and allowed Germany to peacefully reunify. In
exchange, US President George H.W. Bush agreed not to expand NATO’s borders
east, and certainly not to Russia’s borders.
But at the
time, Washington regarded Russia as a broken-down, third world nation beneath
contempt. Bush senior and his successor, Bill Clinton, reneged on the deal with
Moscow and began pushing Western influence east—to the Baltic, Romania and
Bulgaria, Kosovo and Albania, then Georgia, across Central Asia. NATO offered
membership to Ukraine. Moscow saw encirclement.
Having serially
violated Russia’s traditional sphere of influence, it was inevitable Moscow
would riposte. This writer, who extensively covered the Soviet Union, strongly
advised NATO in the early 1990’s not to push east but to leave a strategic
buffer zone in Eastern Europe to maintain peace with nuclear-armed Russia. The
opposite occurred.
The western
allies have committed the same error over Ukraine that they did over
Czechoslovakia in the mid-1930’s: extending security guarantees they could not
possibly fulfill. As of now, it looks like Putin’s gambit over Crimea will work
and there is nothing the West can do about it but huff, puff and impose
mutually negative economic sanctions.
By moving
twelve F-16 fighters to Poland and warships to the Black Sea, a Russian ‘lake,’
Washington has provided enough military forces to spark a war but not to win
it. Anyway, the very clever Putin knows it’s all bluff. He holds the high
cards. Germany’s Angela Merkel, the smartest, most skillful Western leader, is
responding firmly, but with caution, unlike the childish US Republicans who
appear to be yearning for a head-on clash with nuclear-armed Russia.
Washington’s
pot-calls-kettle black denunciations of the Crimea referendum ring hollow given
the blatantly rigged votes coming up in US-dominated Egypt and Afghanistan.
Moreover, too
few in Washington are asking what earthly interests the US has in Ukraine?
About as much as Russia has in Nebraska. Yet the bankrupt US is to lend $1
billion to the anti-Russian Kiev leadership and risk war in a foolish challenge
to Russia in a region where it has nothing to be gained.
Except, of
course, for the US neocons who have played a key role in engineering the coup
in Kiev and this crisis. They want to see Russia punished for supporting Syria
and the Palestinians.
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